J Safety Res by Steiner, Lisa J. et al.
Visual feedback system to reduce errors while operating roof 
bolting machines
Lisa J. Steinera,*, Robin Burgess-Limerickb, Brianna Eitera, William Portera, and Tim Mattya
aCenter for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Office of 
Mining Safety and Health Research, United States
bMinerals Industry Safety and Health Centre, Sustainable Minerals Institute, The University of 
Queensland, Australia
Abstract
Problem—Operators of roof bolting machines in underground coal mines do so in confined 
spaces and in very close proximity to the moving equipment. Errors in the operation of these 
machines can have serious consequences, and the design of the equipment interface has a critical 
role in reducing the probability of such errors.
Methods—An experiment was conducted to explore coding and directional compatibility on 
actual roof bolting equipment and to determine the feasibility of a visual feedback system to alert 
operators of critical movements and to also alert other workers in close proximity to the equipment 
to the pending movement of the machine. The quantitative results of the study confirmed the 
potential for both selection errors and direction errors to be made, particularly during training.
Results—Subjective data confirmed a potential benefit of providing visual feedback of the 
intended operations and movements of the equipment.
Impact—This research may influence the design of these and other similar control systems to 
provide evidence for the use of warning systems to improve operator situational awareness.
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1. Introduction
Roof bolting stabilizes the roof of the mine after coal extraction, reducing the risk of injury 
or fatality associated with a roof fall. However, the task is performed in confined space with 
the operators of roof bolting machines in close proximity to moving parts. Errors in the 
operation of roof bolters have caused many fatalities and injuries. Injuries caused by 
intentional control operation can be divided into the following categories: the wrong control 
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was operated; the correct control was operated in the wrong direction; the intended control 
was operated in the intended direction while the injured employee (a roof bolter operator or 
another person) was in a position of danger (Burgess-Limerick, Krupenia, Zupanc, Wallis, 
& Steiner, 2010; Burgess-Limerick & Steiner, 2006, 2007, 2011).
According to the analyses of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
injury database analyses of the roof bolter accidents from 1984 through 1994, 11 of the 16 
fatalities involved the inadvertent (by the operator, roof fall, etc.) activation of a control 
(MSHA, 1994). Of the 16 fatalities, 14 involved the moving boom. Including victims being 
crushed between the boom and the mine roof, victims being crushed between the boom and 
the canopy, victims being crushed between the boom and the machine frame, and one victim 
being crushed between the boom and the automated temporary roof support (ATRS). Two of 
the 16 fatalities involved a drill mast head where the victims were crushed between the drill 
head and the machine frame. Additional interviews with experienced roof bolters mentioned 
the swing lever when controls were inadvertently operated.
There has been much discussion about the idea of standardizing control design to help 
reduce the probability of such errors. Miller and McLellan (1973) reported that there was a 
need to redesign roof bolter machines. Helander et al. (1980) suggested that “poor human 
factors principles in the design and placement of controls and inappropriately designed 
workstations contribute to a large percentage of injuries” (p. 18). A report by Klishis et al. 
(1993) confirmed that injuries due to incorrect operator control remain a problem.
1.1. Selection errors
In response to several roof bolter operator fatalities, in 1994 MSHA formed a committee 
called the “Coal Mine Safety and Health Roof Bolting Machine Committee” to investigate 
and report causes for these fatalities. The first author served as one of the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines contributors to this investigation. The committee found that one of the leading causes 
was the unintentional operation of controls. A specific suggestion was a recommendation to 
provide the industry with distinct and consistent knob shapes for the controls of the machine. 
From this committee was proposed rule-making in 1997 titled “Safety Standards for the Use 
of Roof-Bolting Machines in Underground Mines” which suggested that design criteria were 
being developed, but no rule making was ever published (MSHA, 1997). Ten years later, the 
New South Wales Department of Primary Industries published Mining Design Guideline 
35.1, (NSW DPI, 2009), in which a standard set of knob shapes are recommended for the 
primary bolting controls.
Although these documents report the apparent need for shape coding of controls to reduce 
inadvertent activation of the wrong control (selection error), there is little scientific evidence 
that shape coding is effective as a control. Many human factors textbooks refer to the need 
to shape code, however the empirical evidence of the effectiveness is not recorded or it 
could not be substantiated that the shape coding was the main discriminating factor to 
improving performance (Chapanis, 1999, p. 15–16; Roscoe, 1980; p. 274).
Weitz (1947) described experiments in which participants operated levers under varying 
shape coding conditions. No differences were found in the number of selection errors 
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between coded and non-coded conditions in situations where the layout of the controls 
remained constant during the experiment. In situations when the controls were altered during 
the experiment, fewer selection errors were made by the participants who were assigned to 
shape coded conditions. Similarly, in a more recent series of experiments utilizing a virtual 
reality analogy of bolting involving a bank of four levers (Burgess-Limerick, Krupenia, 
Wallis, Pratim-Bannerjee and Steiner, 2010), shape coding was only found to reduce 
selection errors when the spatial arrangement of levers was altered during the experiment.
1.2. Directional errors
As noted above, another cause of injury is directional compatibility errors. Directional errors 
are those errors where the correct control is operated but in the opposite direction than what 
was needed to produce the intended outcome. A contributing factor to this type of error may 
be that the directional control-response relationship is not compatible with the direction of 
movement or with the mental model of the operator. The directional control response 
relationships currently in use across mining equipment vary, even within manufacturers, and 
within similar functions, and sometimes change with changes in vehicle direction (Zupanc, 
Burgess-Limerick, & Wallis, 2007). Helander et al. (1980) also found design deficiencies 
and violation of control direction stereotypes associated with mining equipment and 
suggested that these design flaws contributed to increased injury risks.
Though it is agreed that it is important to ensure the compatibility of directional control-
response relationships, the design is not always clear-cut. For example, it is relatively 
common on mining equipment to find situations in which downward movement of a 
horizontal control lever causes upward movement of the controlled element, such as a boom, 
stabilizer jack or drill steel. While some authors (e.g. Helander et al., 1980) have suggested 
that this is a violation of compatible directional control-response relationships, Simpson and 
Chan (1988) suggested that the response may be compatible if the operators assume a ‘see-
saw’ mental model of the situation, where moving the near end of the control downwards 
causes the far end (and the controlled element) to move upwards. These issues have been 
examined more recently using a virtual simulation (Burgess-Limerick, Krupenia, Zupanc, et 
al., 2010).
1.3. Situational awareness
Improving the situational awareness of roof bolter operators is one way to help reduce 
selection and directional compatibility errors. Situational awareness can be defined as “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” 
(Endsley, 1988). Expanding this definition Endsley (1995) describes three levels of 
situational awareness as perception of elements in the environment, comprehension of the 
current situation and projection of future status. When an inadvertent activation of a control 
occurs, the earlier this error is detected, the better. To improve the operator’s situational 
awareness, i.e. detecting errors then correcting them, a feedback control to allow for errors 
to be caught would be beneficial. The control feedback would enable the operator to 
improve performance and reduce the probability of harm to either himself/herself or to 
another individual nearby.
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Currently, the operator must “notice” that the roof bolter arm appendage is moving in the 
wrong direction before he/she can correct the action. At that point, it may already be too late 
and the result can be catastrophic. Operational errors become even more critical when the 
error is performed out of the context of their routine job of placing roof bolts. For instance, 
the operator may get himself/herself caught between the drill mast and ATRS (relating to the 
drill feed control) or between the rib and the boom (relating to the swing control). In that 
moment, there is no room for an incorrect activation and yet, it may be highly probable for 
an error to be made when the motion is not in the context of the normal routine of placing 
roof bolts. Any feedback or warning information as to the correct directional movement 
would be invaluable.
A visual feedback system may serve to improve situational awareness by providing the 
operator with feedback prior to machine movement. A current technology being developed 
at the NIOSH Office of Mine Safety and Health Research (OMSHR) gave promising results 
of reducing time for subjects to detect and identify the direction of movement of a 
continuous mining machine when operators were standing in different operating positions 
during backing out and tramming tasks (Sammarco, Gallagher, Mayton, & Srednicki, 2012). 
The results indicated that in a dark environment, such as found in a mine, the visual 
feedback system on the continuous mining machine in this study “vastly improves an 
individual’s ability to quickly detect machine motions, in many cases by well over one 
second”. The research suggests that such a system could be an important tool to alert 
underground miners to impending or active machine motion which could prevent struck-by 
or pinning accidents in underground mining, such as the type of accidents involved with roof 
bolting machines. This same technology may be helpful for roof bolter operators when used 
in the context of operating controls. With accurate and improved situation awareness, roof 
bolter operators can react and respond more rapidly and with higher accuracy. An 
improvement in the feedback mechanism may provide the additional benefits of situational 
awareness.
1.4. Objectives
The aims of this research were (i) to determine whether the patterns of selection errors and 
direction errors observed while operating a real bolting machine in a laboratory are 
consistent with previous research using a virtual simulation analogous to bolting, and (ii) to 
determine whether a visual feedback intervention could improve the operators ability to 
recognize and correct a lever selection or direction error before adverse effects of the 
incorrect action are realized.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen adult male participants (age range of 22 to 56 years, mean=37, SD=11) who were 
practicing, experienced roof bolter operators (underground mining experience range of one 
month to 36 years, mean=10.1 years, SD=11.4 years) were recruited using word of mouth 
with the United Mine Workers of America and other mines. All participants had experience 
working with a roof bolter machine (range of 1 months to 20 years, mean=4.7 years, SD=5.5 
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years). Thirteen of the 16 participants had experience on the Fletcher Roof Ranger II 
machine, the machine used in these tests. An equal mix of union and non-union roof bolter 
operators were recruited to ensure all types of operations were included. All participants had 
normal, or corrected to normal vision, and were right handed. All participants provided 
written informed consent prior to the commencement of testing and were free to withdraw at 
any point in the experiments. Ethical approval to run all studies was given by the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Human Subjects Review Board.
2.2. Apparatus
All experiments were conducted in the Human Performance Research Mine (HPRM) at the 
NIOSH, OMSHR in Pittsburgh, PA. The HPRM is a simulated underground mine 
environment with various testing apparatuses, data acquisition and control systems, and 
networked computers. The HPRM is large enough to house actual working mining 
equipment.
Participants were tested on an actual Fletcher Roof Ranger II Roof Bolter machine provided 
by Fletcher Manufacturing for a three-month period (Fig. 1a and b). The roof bolter was 
modified by Fletcher and NIOSH to provide additional safety precautions as indicated 
through the HSRB procedures and enable comparison with previous experimental testing 
(not yet published) on a mock-up bolter arm. The original machine had only 4 levers and a 
joystick. The joystick controls the rotation and the drill feed. For this experiment, the 
joystick control was decoupled and replaced with two levers to separate the controls for 
rotation and drill feed. Therefore a total of six mechanical directional hydraulic control 
valves were available. The directional hydraulic control valves operate the canopy, stabilizer 
jack, boom extension, boom swing, drill rotation and drill elevation. Additional changes 
were made to the roof bolter machine on-site in order for participants to encounter different 
lever assignments and directional operation than they were expecting so that errors could be 
measured.
These changes mostly involved reversing and rearranging the hydraulics to change the 
direction of movement of machine appendages. Fig. 2a and b show the experimental arm 
and one test subject using the experiment set-up. Fig. 3a and b illustrate the original and 
reconfigured testing layout of levers.
2.3. Instrumentation
For these experiments the roof bolting machine was equipped with two LED indicator lights 
within view of the operator to designate the operation of the boom swing out/away and the 
drill raise functions. The swing out/away used a red LED light that was placed just above the 
control bank and was directed towards the outside of the machine so that while the boom 
was swinging outward, its light would illuminate the rib and could be seen by workers 
coming onto the section; from this location the operator was able to easily see this swing 
light peripherally. The drill feed used a blue LED light located on the drill feed mechanism 
pointing upwards toward the drill hole. The operator can easily see this light while using the 
control bank. When a small amount of pressure was applied to the lever, the light was 
activated. When more pressure was applied to the lever the machine appendage moved. Both 
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LED light interventions could be turned off or on to match a given testing condition. The 
choice of providing an LED light to the drill feed and swing out/away control directions 
were based partially on MSHA accident data and partially on the authors’ discussions with 
several experienced roof bolter operators (MSHA, 1994). These two LED lights comprised 
the visual feedback system intervention. Additionally, because roof bolts were not actually 
placed during the tests, incandescent lights (green and yellow) were added to the drill head 
to represent the rotational directions of the roof drill. It was not possible to show the action 
of rotation on the video stimuli so the light colors substituted for these actions. A green light 
was used for clockwise rotation and yellow for counterclockwise.
Instrumentation was also added to the Fletcher Roof Ranger II Roof Bolter to record the 
operator’s actions during the laboratory tests. Two micro switches were used to monitor 
each of the six mechanical hydraulic directional control valves to enable recording of the 
following: canopy raise/lower, stabilizer jack raise/lower, boom extend/retract, boom swing 
in/out, drill rotation CW/CCW, and drill feed raise/lower. The operator was also provided 
with a momentary push button to acknowledge he was ready for the start of each test.
The outputs from all the micro switches, operators acknowledge push button, and LED 
lights statuses were input into a DATAFORTH 16 channel analog I/O backplane 
(SCMPB02) containing 15 isolated signal input modules (SCM5B33-04D) which output 0 to 
10 VDC. As each control was activated by the subject an electrical signal was sent to an 
analog-to-digital board (PCI-6033E National Instruments, Austin, TX) and a control signal 
was sent to a hydraulic valve to move the arm in the corresponding action. The A/D board 
was controlled by Matlab’s Data Acquisition toolbox (MATLAB®; The MathWorks, Inc, 
Natick, MA) and data were collected at 1000 Hz. A computer controlled Samsung 24″ 
Syncmaster 245BW LCD display (Microsoft PowerPoint 2004, Microsoft, Seattle, WA) was 
placed on a cart in front of the bolter to produce a visual stimulus (described in the stimulus 
section below). Subjects were asked to use the six control levers to move the roof bolter arm 
to match those of the visual stimulus. The levers were either identical, length coded, or 
shape coded according to the recommendations of MDG35 and either in a vertical or a 
horizontal orientation (Fig. 4a and b).
2.4. Stimuli
Video clips of all possible movements of the machine were recorded without the levers in 
the video. These stimuli were used to show the operator the movements of the machine that 
they would mimic using the physical levers in front of them. The clips were all independent 
movements of the machine and were uniform in time, distance and aspect ratio. They were 
taken from the perspective of where the operator would stand. These stimuli were triggered 
when the administrator clicked a computer mouse after the participant acknowledged, 
through the pressing of the audible momentary button, that they were ready for the next 
stimulus. A signal was recorded when the stimulus was initiated and the test started. The 
stimuli were shown to the participant via the Samsung 24″ LCD monitor located at eye level 
within 7 feet of the participant’s standing position.
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2.5. Experimental design and procedure
Each participant was individually tested on the Fletcher Roof Ranger II machine located in 
the HPRM. The participant’s age, handedness, demographics and expected control-response 
relationship for all machine movements were recorded. Additionally normal or corrected-to-
normal vision was confirmed. A randomized experimental condition was used for each 
subject (Table 1). Each subject was asked to complete a total of 288 trials of 12 different 
actions (six levers with two directions each). The tests were blocked into 6 separate sections 
around 6 minutes each with a two to three minute break in between each section. Each 
section consisted of 48 trials with four repetitions of each action presented in a randomized 
order.
Prior to testing, each participant was shown the set-up and a set of standard instructions was 
read to each participant. They were each told that they would be operating the roof bolting 
machine and would be required to face the computer screen, operating six different controls 
using their right hand only. They were asked which way they believed the lever should be 
activated to make the appendage move in a particular direction. This was recorded as the 
perceived stereotype of the directional relationship. The instructions about the task were 
given with the emphasis on that it should be carried out as fast and accurately as possible. 
Because of the relatively simple nature of the task the participant was not given any practice 
time prior to commencement of the experiment. The subjects were then asked to stand by 
the bolter controls station with their right arm depressing the button on the control arm and 
their left arm at their side, the subjects were only allowed to use their right hand for testing. 
A testing session trial was then started provided the audible button was depressed. For each 
trial a short pause of a still picture of the video was given as a pre-cue and then a 2 to 3 
second video was shown on display. The subjects were instructed to release the button once 
they made a decision as to what lever was needed to duplicate the action. They then traveled 
to this lever to choose the direction to operate the lever in order to duplicate the action 
shown on the screen. The stimulus was only shown once and only one action was shown for 
each trial (i.e. no sequence of actions). If an error was made, the operator had time to 
recover the error. Only one correction attempt was recorded. The subjects were asked to 
return the bolter arm to the starting position and activate the audible button with their right 
hand in preparation for the next trial. At the end of all trials, baseline motor movement times 
were established by asking participants to move a lever in a particular direction while 
recording response time (i.e. no choices involved). For these trials the subjects were 
instructed to release the red button and activate one of the six levers in a particular direction 
once they hear the command to do so. This was repeated three times for each lever/direction 
combination. Structured pre and post experiment questions were asked regarding the 
operation of roof bolting machines in the mine and the light interventions they experienced 
in the experiment.
2.6. Dependent measures
Control selection errors (SEs), and direction errors (DEs) were recorded. A control SE was 
identified when the wrong lever was selected for completion of the task. A control DE was 
identified when the correct lever was operated, but in the wrong direction. For this 
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Fig. 5a presents selection error by block and coding. While there was a significant effect of 
block [F(5,65)=11.6, p<0.0001], there was no significant effect of coding [F(2,65)=1.055, 
p=0.376]. While the median selection error rate for length and shape coded groups was 
lower than the group with identical levers for blocks 2 and 3 (as might be predicted if coding 
is a training aid), the interaction between block and coding was not significant 
[F(10,65)=0.5806, p=0.8239].
Direction error rates as a function of lever, and lever orientation is presented in Fig. 5b. A 
significant main effect of control lever was evident [F(5,84)=3.551, p=0.0058], however 
there was no significant effect of lever orientation [F(1,84)=0.2818, p=0.5969], nor was 
there a significant interaction [F(5,84)=0.2477, p=0.0399].
Fig. 5c presents direction error rates as a function of lever, and of whether the light 
intervention was enabled (for swing and drill functions). No significant effects of the light 
intervention were noted.
3.1.1. Subjective data—Participants were exposed to either the visual feedback system 
(light on drill feed up and light on swing out/away condition) or not. However, participants 
who did not have the visual feedback system condition were shown the lights and how the 
system would work on the machine after the end of their trials. The participants were asked 
the following questions pre and post experiment:
Pre-test questions
1. Have you ever grabbed the wrong control when operating the bolter?
• If so, was it while bolting or tramming?
• What control(s) did you grab incorrectly?
• Why do you think that happened?
2. Have you ever activated a control in the wrong direction?
• If so, was it while bolting or tramming?
• What control(s) did you operate in the wrong direction?
• Why do you think that happened?
All participants (100%) responded yes to #1 pre-test question ‘Have you ever grabbed the 
wrong control when operating the bolter?’ Majority of the participants indicated doing this 
while bolting (14 of the 16 participants, or 87.5%). 12.5% (2 of 16) reported grabbing the 
wrong control during both bolting and tramming. Participants erroneously grabbed the 
swing (56%), the extend control (25%), the canopy and drill feed (both 12%) and the 
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rotation control (.06%). When asked ‘Why do you think this happened?’ majority of 
participants report not looking at the controls while operating the roof bolter (12 of the 16 
participants, or 75%). 31% of participants reported grabbing the wrong control because they 
were rushing or not paying attention to the task and 19% said they either couldn’t see the 
controls or made a mistake because of the position of the controls.
Majority of participants (69%) also responded yes to pre-test question #2, ‘Have you ever 
activated a control in the wrong direction?’ Participants indicate doing this primarily while 
bolting (73%) and erroneously grabbing the swing (64%). When asked ‘Why do you think 
this happened?’ Participants reported activating a control in the wrong direction because 
they were either not paying attention (45%) or in a hurry doing the job (27%).
Post-test questions
1. Did you find that the light feedback helped you to choose the correct, direction or 
to help you correct your error if you made one?
2. Would a light feedback system be useful for you on the job? When would it be 
most useful?
For post-test question #1, ‘Did you find that the light feedback helped you to choose the 
correct direction or to help you correct your error if you made one?’ 43% (3 of 7) of the 
participants who were NOT exposed to the light feedback said they would find the light 
helpful while 78% (7 of 9) of the participants who were exposed to the light feedback found 
it useful.
Prior to seeing the light feedback, one participant indicated that the light “…would be 
distracting”. He thinks they would cover it up if it were on the machine. He also did not 
think it would be helpful. After the experiment was complete, he was shown the visual 
feedback lights and thought “it very well could be helpful for training.”
For post-test question #2, ‘Would a light feedback system be useful for you on the job? 
When would it be most useful?’, the majority of participants in both conditions indicated 
that having a light feedback system would be useful for them on the job. 100% of those 
participants exposed to the light feedback found it useful while 71% of participants not 
given light feedback found it useful (5 of the 7 participants responded yes in this condition 
while one participant refrained from responding).
Participants who thought the light feedback system would be useful for their job indicated 
the system would be most useful during training (6 of 16 participants – 38%), as a warning 
system (4 of 16 participants – 25%) and as a signal that the roof bolting arm was swinging 
(3 of 16 – 23%; one participant chose not to respond to this question).
4. Discussion
The selection error data were consistent with those previously gathered from an examination 
of shape coding in a virtual simulation (Burgess-Limerick, Krupenia, Wallis, et al., 2010), 
and with the previous literature. Selection errors are likely to be made, particularly in the 
early stages of learning a new lever layout, even by experienced operators. Shape coding 
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may be beneficial if it is consistently applied to the same machine functions across different 
machines.
The direction error data similarly confirm that directional error rates are relatively high, but 
that the error rates vary considerably across functions. Where directional control response 
compatibility is maintained (e.g. drill feed) the direction error rate was very low. Sump 
(extension) movements of the bolter arm required movements of the control levers which 
were perpendicular to the direction of the response, and this lack of compatibility resulted in 
higher direction error rates. Directional error probability can be reduced by, as far as 
possible, ensuring directional control-response compatibility. This finding is consistent with 
the previous literature and the examination of a virtual analogy of bolting (Burgess-
Limerick, Krupenia, Zupanc, et al., 2010).
Although the direction error rate was not significantly different between groups with and 
without the visual feedback system, the qualitative data indicated that the workers generally 
found the lights helpful. The control that most operators said they selected incorrectly was 
the swing control. Most operators report they do not look at the controls when operating 
their equipment. Other explanations include being in a hurry or selecting the wrong control 
because of the positioning of the controls. Since the controls all look and feel the same as 
each other, it is difficult to distinguish between controls. Operators said they “count” or 
“feel” for the right control in terms of its position or order and sometimes make a mistake. 
They also reported that when they operate the controls in the wrong direction it is while they 
are bolting and mostly with the swing control. This further establishes that the swing is a 
control that gives the operators the most difficulty and may not match their mental models of 
directional compatibility. The swing (left and right motion) moves in a different plane than 
the action direction of its control lever (up and down). The drill feed, as evidenced by the 
MSHA injury and fatality data, and the swing as evidenced by discussions with roof bolter 
operators and answers to these experimental questions, are the two controls which can be 
confused and may result in catastrophic events when operated at the wrong time or in the 
wrong direction.
The lack of significance in the quantitative data may be due to the simple nature of task and 
the lack of other distractions during the experiment. Since there are limited action choices as 
a roof bolter operator, the simplicity of the task itself only generates a small number of 
errors even with the changes to the machine with which they had experience. The number of 
errors may have been reduced further depending on whether operators prioritized accuracy 
over speed.
The lower positive response rate to QUESTION #1 by the miners exposed and NOT 
exposed to the light feedback may be related to these same issues. The error rate of both 
these subject groups was low to begin with; therefore, it is less likely that they would feel 
the need for additional aid.
The anecdotal comment from one of the subjects NOT exposed to the light feedback adds 
credence to this thought; after exposure to the system, he responded more favorably. 
However, both groups responded positively to QUESTION #2 indicating that the light 
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feedback would be helpful even if it did not help them. They reported that it would have 
been very helpful when they were training to operate the roof bolter machine. This cue 
should likely be incorporated into the design of the machine to address the possibility of 
operators relying on that feedback while performing bolting tasks. There is evidence in the 
literature that cueing decreases error rates and that withholding a cue that a participant has 
been trained to use increases error rates (Ament, Lai, & Cox, 2011). Because error rates for 
both groups of participants was low to begin with, it can be speculated that participants did 
not need the additional aid because majority of the participants could be considered an 
expert at the task (median time working as a roof bolter=4.67 years).
The positive response to the use of the visual feedback system is encouraging because based 
on human factors principles the light feedback should improve attention (Lynas & Horberry, 
2011 and Stanton, Chambers, & Piggott, 2001). The light feedback increases task attention 
spatially and temporally as well as providing feedback redundancy in conjunction with the 
bolter motion itself (Wogalter & Mayhorn, 2005). The additional lighting on the drill feed 
up motion will also provide additional lighting when placing the roof bolt, a request that 
several roof bolters have mentioned during underground discussions of roof bolting tasks.
5. Limitations and future direction
A limitation to this study was the small number of roof bolter operators that were available 
for this study. It is costly and difficult at this time of mine worker shortages to have workers 
tested. Other types of interventions could have been compared and tested along with placing 
the visual feedback system on controls other than the drill feed up and swing out/away. It 
may have been helpful to test selection errors and directional compatibility errors with a 
larger number of controls. This may help identify when shape-coding, length-coding and 
location coding is most beneficial. Also, it may be possible to compare error rates and 
reaction times of new bolter operator trainees with and without this feedback system as well 
as determine how such an intervention can change the way they do their jobs.
6. Summary and impact on Industry
The data illustrate the importance of multiple control barriers to both reduce the probability 
of errors (shape coding and compatible directional control-response relationships) and 
control measures aimed at making systems error tolerant, and allowing operators to detect 
and recover from errors before negative consequences are realized. The experiment 
confirmed the need for additional attention to the swing and drill feed. The visual warning 
system may be an acceptable and appropriate intervention while the standardization of 
controls is further examined. It is possible that this type of intervention is effective for times 
when there is little time for decisions and an error in direction of a lever could result in 
injury or even death. The situation where the operator is using the controls out of the context 
of their normal routine or when the operator is training for the first months of their jobs, this 
visual feedback can maximize safety and minimize learning time. It may be necessary to 
carry-on this feedback once the operator has used it for training. This cost-effective solution 
should be studied in the environment to ensure its intended use. Applications beyond mining 
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can extend to any control design where feedback is critical to the health and safety of the 
operator and there is a need to improve situational awareness.
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Operator on a RRII machine (a) and the joystick control on a RRII (b).
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Experimental roof bolting controls (a) and Operator during experimental trials (b).
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Actual roof bolter set up (a) and changed set up for experiment (b).
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Typical lever shape (a) and suggested MDG35 shape-coded controls (b).
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a. Selection error by block and coding (length, shape or non-coded). b. Directional error by 
control lever and orientation (horizontal or vertical). c. Direction error by control lever and 
visual feedback light intervention.
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1 Light On, Length Coded, Horizontal
2 Light On, Length Coded, Vertical
3 Light On, Shape Coded, Horizontal
4 Light On, Shape Coded, Vertical
5 Light On, Non-Shape Coded, Horizontal
6 Light On, Non-Shape Coded, Vertical
7 Light Off, Length Coded, Horizontal
8 Light Off, Length Coded, Vertical
9 Light Off, Shape Coded, Horizontal
10 Light Off, Shape Coded, Vertical
11 Light Off, Non-Shape Coded, Horizontal
12 Light Off, Non-Shape Coded, Vertical
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